The Constitutionality Under The First
Amendment Of Statutes Granting A Right
Of Reply Or Access To The Print Media by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 31 | Issue 2 Article 4
Summer 6-1-1974
The Constitutionality Under The First Amendment
Of Statutes Granting A Right Of Reply Or Access
To The Print Media
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
The Constitutionality Under The First Amendment Of Statutes Granting A Right Of Reply Or Access To
The Print Media, 31 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 323 (1974), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/
vol31/iss2/4
NOTES & COMMENTS
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT OF STATUTES GRANTING A RIGHT
OF REPLY OR ACCESS TO THE PRINT MEDIA
By allowing the press freedom from governmental restraint, the
first amendment' was intended to ensure vigorous discussion of ideas,
revelation of governmental abuses, and a flow of diverse information
to the general public.2 In the century and a half that followed the
amendment's ratification, newspapers were small in circulation and
there was no significant concentration of economic control within the
newspaper industry. However, in recent times rapid technological
developments have altered the earlier situation and have contributed
to the rise of large, quasi-monopolistic metropolitan newspapers. 3
Although the rise of these newspapers has greatly increased their
ability to promote discussion and reveal abuses, it has at the same
time increased their potential to act as private censors and stifle the
flow of information to the public.4 Indeed, this increased potential
for censorship has led one eminent first amendment authority,
Jerome A. Barron,5 to suggest that the mass media have developed
an "antipathy to ideas" which "requires legal intervention" to ensure
that the guarantee of freedom of the press does not become a "ration-
ale for repressing competing ideas."'
'The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2See, e.g., Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions, 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 569-71 (1888) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOT'S DEBATES];
Levy, Liberty and the First Amendment, 68 AM. HIsT. REV. 22, 33-37 (1962).
3See E. EMERY, P. AULT, & W. AGEE, INTRODUCTION TO MASS COMMUNICATIONS 132-
36 (3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as EMERY, AULT, & AGEE]. For a detailed presenta-
tion of current ownership figures and trends and their significance, see note 98 infra.
'As a newspaper grows in size and reaches a large circulation, the power of its
publishers to stimulate or stifle the flow of information affects a greater number of
persons. See notes 98 and 117 and accompanying texts infra.
'Professor of Law, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
'Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HAv. L. REV.
1641, 1641-42 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Barron]. This is the leading article. Others
supporting an "access" approach to press regulation include Barron, Access-The
Only Choice for the Media?, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 766 (1970); Barron, An Emerging First
Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1969); Note,
The Duty of Newspapers to Accept Political Advertising-An Attack on Tradition, 44
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Probably the most widely proposed remedy for the potential re-
pression of ideas by the modern press has been right of reply or access
statutes. Such statutes would compel newspapers to publish the
views of individuals and groups whose ideas might otherwise be either
inadequately expressed or totally unexpressed.' More particularly,
right of reply statutes would require that space be made available to
parties editorially attacked by the press, while right of access statutes
would simply require that space be made available to parties whose
ideas have not received adequate coverage. At least with respect to
the subject areas or interest groups to which such legislation would
apply, right of reply or access statutes would negate the repressive
potential of the print media by requiring a "balanced" presentation
of ideas."
However, the prospect of such right of reply or access statutes
raises the significant constitutional question of whether a newspaper
may be statutorily compelled to grant access to its columns for the
presentation of divergent viewpoints. Although the proponents of
such legislation9 contend that it may be validated on the basis of
analogy to existing legislation in other areas, such as the fairness
doctrine of the Federal Communications Commission,"0 their primary
IND. L.J. 222 (1969); Note, Monopoly Newspapers: Troubles in Paradise, 7 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 268 (1970); Note, Resolving the Free Speech-Free Press Dichotomy: Access to
the Press through Advertising, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 293 (1969). Contra, Daniel, Right of
Access to Mass Media-Government Obligation to Enforce First Amendment?, 48
TEXAS L. REv. 783 (1970); Note, A Fairness Doctrine for the Press, 40 N.D.L. REv. 317
(1964). Most of the articles cited here, and particularly those by Barron, deal with the
media in general. This article will address the constitutionality of right of access
statutes only as applied to the print media. Though relevant, a specific consideration
of the constitutionality of further regulation of the broadcast media for the purpose of
guaranteeing access is beyond the scope of this article. For a thorough and critical
discussion of the access doctrine with respect to the mass media in general, see Lange,
The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical
Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1973).
-The general thrust of the proposals made by Barron and other writers is directed
at large, monopolistic daily newspapers. See articles cited note 6 supra. Recent deci-
sions in state courts have, however, demonstrated that reply or access legislation may
in fact have a much broader sweep. See Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., No.
43,009 (Fla., July 18, 1973), appeal docketed 42 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1973)
(No. 797); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 298 N.E.2d 829 (Mass. 1973); Opinion
of the Justices to the Senate, 284 N.E.2d 919 (Mass. 1972).
'See, e.g., Barron, supra note 6, at 1670-78.
'See articles cited note 6 supra.
"Although it did not base its decision on an extension of the fairness doctrine, in
a recent decision the Florida Supreme Court did not dismiss the argument for exten-
sion of that doctrine by analogy. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., No. 43,009
NOTES AND COMMENTS
assertion is that right of reply or access statutes should survive judi-
cial scrutiny through a re-examination of first amendment theory in
light of the power of the modern press to stifle the flow of ideas."
A recent Florida decision revealed some of the general problems
involved in assessing the constitutionality of right of reply or access
legislation. In Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 2 the Florida
Supreme Court upheld a 1913 law 3 providing for access to the press
(Fla. July 18, 1973) at 12, appeal docketed 42 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1973) (No.
797).
For general discussion of proposals based on analogy to existing legislation see
articles cited in note 6 supra. Most commonly suggested are an extension to newspa-
pers of the fairness doctrine of the Federal Communications Commission and a finding
that newspapers may be regulated as serving a "public function," because their poli-
cies are tinged with "state action." For a discussion of these alternative justifications
for right of reply or access statutes, see notes 119-51 and accompanying text infra.
A third proposal would impose access requirements through regulation of the press
based upon its essentially commercial nature via the doctrine that "when commercial
purposes dominate the matrix of expression seeking first amendment protection, first
amendment directives must be restructured. When commercial considerations domi-
nate, often leading the media to repress ideas, these media should not be allowed to
resist controls designed to promote vigorous debate and expression by cynical reliance
on the first amendment." Barron, supra note 6, at 1663, relying upon Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). This proposal ignores the insurmountable distinc-
tion that Ginzburg involved an attempt to gain first amendment protection for obscene
materials, a type of expression not considered to be within the scope of the first
amendment's protection. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). It would
also be untenable to assert that material published by a newspaper could be regulated
as "commercial speech" simply because a newspaper is a business enterprise. Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973);
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Whether or not there is "often" repres-
sion of ideas where "commercial considerations dominate" is, of course, subject to
dispute.
"Barron, supra note 6, at 1642: "First amendment theory must be reexamined,
for only by responding to the present reality of the mass media's repression of ideas
can the constitutional guarantee of free speech best serve its original purposes." Id. at
1655: "[Tjhe right of free expression is not an absolute right . . .and to guarantee
access to divergent, otherwise unexpressed ideas would so promote the societal inter-
ests underlying the first amendment as to outweigh the medium's claim." As this quote
indicates, Barron feels that through a "balancing" analysis the first amendment may
be infused with a certain responsiveness to the realities of the modern media and access
statutes may be held constitutionally valid. For a discussion of the balancing test see
note 20-65 and accompanying text infra.
"2No. 43,009 (Fla., July 18, 1973), appeal docketed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov.
19, 1973) (No. 797). Contra, Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 298 N.E.2d 829
(Mass. 1973).
' FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1973): Newspapers assail-
ing candiate in an election; space for reply
If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of
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by political candidates for the purpose of replying to editorial criti-
cism. 4 Reversing a trial court invalidation of the reply statute, the
Florida Supreme Court found in a per curiam opinion that the statute
was neither void for vagueness nor violative of the first amendment.' 5
In resolving the first amendment question, the court balanced the
newspaper's editorial freedom to publish or refuse to publish replies
against the public interest in maximizing the flow of information and
ideas through a statutorily guaranteed right of access."6 The public's
interest-the "right of the reader to the whole story"' 7-was found to
outweigh the freedom of the press to refuse publication, and the
constitutionality of the statute was upheld. In further support of its
decision, the Florida court maintained that the statute did not violate
the first amendment because it enhanced, rather than abridged, free-
dom of the press.18
any candidate for nomination or for election in any election, or charges
said candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise
attacks his official record, or gives to another free space for such pur-
poses, such newspaper shall upon request of such candidate immedi-
ately publish free of cost any reply he may make thereto in as conspic-
uous a place and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for
such reply, provided such reply does not take up more space than the
matter replied to. Any person or firm failing to comply with the provi-
sions of this section shall be guilty of misdemeanor of the first degree,
punishable as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083.
"The statute was enacted in 1913 as part of a legislative package designed to
correct the abuses which had arisen under Florida's 1909 corrupt practices act. See
generally Keen, Brief History of the Corrupt Practices Act of Florida, 9 FLA. L.J. 297
(1935). In 1972 H.B. 2801, a bill providing for the repeal of § 104.38, died in committee.
Brief for Appellant at xvii, Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., No. 43,009 (Fla.,
July 18, 1973).
IsNo. 43,009 (Fla., July 18, 1973) at 2, 9. Since this note is concerned with the
constitutionality under the first amendment of right of access statutes, it is assumed
that such a statute may be drafted so as to withstand a constitutional attack on
vagueness grounds. The issue of impermissible vagueness is therefore without the scope
of this article.
The questions raised by inquiries as to statutory vagueness do, however, serve to
emphasize the difficulty of drafting statutes of this nature with precision. For example,
it might be asked with respect to the Florida statute: whether "any newspaper" in-
cludes dailies only, weeklies, magazines, pamphlets, special interest newspapers, and
newspapers published out-of-state; whether an "assault" on personal character or an
attack on an official's record encompasses truthful and valid criticism; whether the
"candidate" attacked need be mentioned by name. See id. at 16 (Boyd, J., dissenting);
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 284 N.E.2d 919 (Mass. 1972). The Supreme
Court has noted that "standards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the
area of free expression." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963).




The Tornillo opinion reveals a dual approach to first amendment
analysis, relying both upon a balancing of competing interests and a
defining of the term "abridge."' 9 Since the two approaches conflict
from a theoretical standpoint, the Florida court's utilization of both
suggests an absence of resolve on the part of the court as to the proper
standards for judicial review in first amendment cases. Any general
appraisal of the constitutionality of right of reply or access statutes
must, therefore, consider the proper approach to first amendment
analysis of such statutes as well as their potential impact upon a free
press.
FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF ACCESS STATUTES
A. The Inadequacies of the Balancing Test
Proponents of access statutes seem to prefer that courts employ
the "balancing" method for determining the constitutionality of such
statutes under the first amendment." The balancing test involves a
case-by-case weighing of the policy interests embraced within the
challenged statute2' against the freedoms protected by the first
amendment. In essence, a court must determine whether the benefits
to be gained from the legislation justify intrusion upon freedom of the
press.22 Barron seems to take the position that enlightened applica-
tion of the balancing test can accomplish whatever "restructuring"
of first amendment concepts might be necessary to vindicate the
constitutionality of right of reply or access legislation.? An examina-
tion of the development and use of the balancing test reveals that the
great flexibility of the test renders it less than satisfactory for analysis
of right of reply or access statutes.?
The balancing test was spawned by Schneider v. State,25 where
"See notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra.
"For a concise explanation of the "balancing" test, see EMERSON, TOWARD A GEN-
ERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 53-56 (1966) [hereinafter cited as EMERSON].
210ne policy interest allegedly furthered by reply or access legislation is the max-
imization of the flow of information to the public-the public's "right to know." For a
presentation of the interests which would allegedly be promoted by right of reply or
access legislation, see Barron, supra note 6.
21EMERSON, supra note 20, at 53-56.
zBarron asserts that when the media repress ideas, "first amendment directives
must be restructured," so that the public interest can override the first amendment
claims of the mass media. Barron, supra note 6, at 1663. See also Barron, Access-The
Only Choice for the Media?, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 766, 769 (1970).
21See generally Emerson, supra note 20; Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 865 (1960); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Frantz].
-308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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the Supreme Court stated that courts should be astute to assess the
effect of legislation that has been challenged as an abridgement of
freedom of speech or press." The Court explained that legislative
judgment which would be sufficient to support regulation of other
activities might not justify regulation of "vital" first amendment
freedoms; therefore, courts must weigh the competing interests in
each case and "appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced
in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights. 2 7 In
Schneider the Court seemed to emphasize the tenet, which it later
abandoned,2 that statutes regulating either speech or the press would
not be entitled to the normal presumption of validity.2 9
Although the balancing test was originally used to invalidate laws
which intruded upon first amendment rights, 0 it was later employed
to justify laws which admittedly infringed upon the freedoms of
speech and press'.3 The test was apparently first proposed as the
In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgement of the rights is
asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the
challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respect-
ing matters of public convenience may well support regulation di-
rected at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such
as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of
democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and diffi-
cult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to
appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the
regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.
Id. at 161.
The case dealt with the constitutionality of local ordinances forbidding the distri-
bution of handbills. Although the ordinances were non-discriminatory in that they
prohibited all handbills, the Court found them to be unconstititional, stating that the
interests of the municipal government in maintaining order and cleanliness of the




2"See notes 43-48 and accompanying text infra.
-308 U.S. 147, 161 (quoted at note 25 supra); Frantz, supra note 24, at 1425 (1962).
As Justice Stone said in United States v. Carolene Products Co.: "There may be
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those
of the first ten amendments .... " 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For statements by
the Supreme Court to the effect that the usual presumption of validity does not apply
in cases involving the regulation of expression, see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 517,
530 (1945); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943);
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937).
30See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 96 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
3'See American Communications Ass'n v. Doud, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (upholding
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proper method of analysis for all free speech cases in Dennis v. United
States.32 The Dennis conception of the balancing test finds within the
first amendment no "unlimited, unqualified right," but rather a
"societal value" or interest which "must, on occasion, be subordi-
nated to other values and considerations. '33 After reviewing prior first
amendment cases, 34 Chief Justice Vinson in the majority opinion
made it clear that the first amendment should not be viewed as an
inviolable command: "Speech is not an absolute, above and beyond
control by the legislature . . . .Nothing is more certain in modern
society than the principle that there are no absolutes. . . ,,31 There-
fore, under the balancing test courts do not recognize any core of
absolute freedom of speech or of the press within the first amend-
ment.3 6 In deciding the constitutionality of legislation challenged on
first amendment grounds, a court need only determine whether "the
gravity of the 'evil' [sought to be remedied by the statute], dis-
counted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech
[or press] as is necessary to avoid the danger." 37 If, for example, the
the non-Communist affidavit provision of the Taft-Hartley Act). The Court said that
protection of the public may justify an infringement of first amendment rights and that
the Court must balance the interest protected by the law against that of freedom of
speech to determine which deserves the greater protection. Id. at 398-99.
-3 41 U.S. 494 (1951). "The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well
as the interest in national security are better served by candid and informed weighing
of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial process, than by an-
nouncing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidean problems to be solved." Id. at
524-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"Id. at 503.
311d. at 502-08.
"Id. at 508. In asserting the axiom that there are no "absolutes," the Court has
even pointed out that to treat the first amendment freedom of speech as absolute would
invalidate laws on libel, fraud, and other subjects. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S.
36, 49 n.10 (1961). In response, Frantz states that
[tihis seems no more than a non sequitur, based on failure to distin-
guish between two of the numerous meanings of the word "absolute."
The premise is that the first amendment cannot be "absolute" in the
sense of unlimited in scope. But the conclusion is that it cannot be
"absolute" in the sense of unconditionally obligatory within its proper
scope, whatever that may be.
Frantz, supra note 24, at 1436.
uSee, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1
(1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Braden v. United States, 365 U.S.
431 (1961); Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388 (1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109 (1959).
wDennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951), quoting United States v.
Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, C.J.). This is an often-quoted and
concise formulation of the balancing test.
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"evil" of private censorship by the print media is considered of such
gravity and probability as to justify regulation of press content in the
name of fairness, it follows that areas of press freedom traditionally
unregulated38 may be invaded, just as may areas traditionally on the
fringes of first amendment protection. 3 Thus, while the freedoms of
speech and press may be treated as highly valued interests under the
balancing test, their strength will nonetheless be determined by the
weight of countervailing interests such as national security0 or, in the
case of access legislation, the public's "right" to full and fair presen-
tation of ideas.' If the countervailing interests weigh heavily enough,
there is no limit to the degree of infringement upon first amendment
freedom which may be constitutionally permitted.2 These counter-
vailing interests, however, have no constitutional origin; their valid-
ity is merely the product of legislative judgment.
Through continued use of the balancing test, courts have aban-
doned what previously seemed to be a major consideration of the test:
that statutes regulating first amendment freedoms are not entitled to
the normal presumption of validity.13 By granting the traditional pre-
sumption of validity to legislative enactments, courts may declare
31All ideas of social importance were meant to have the full protection of the first
amendment. See note 74 and accompanying text infra. James Madison's view as to
the wide range of vitriolic expression afforded protection by the first amendment are
set forth in ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2 at 569-80.
"See note 35 supra. There is ample evidence that the first amendment was not
intended to protect all forms of speech. Among the exceptions are libel, fraud, and
obscenity, but "[aill ideas having even the slightest redeeming social import-
ance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing cli-
mate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties .. " Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). For a generously footnoted discussion of forms of
speech which have historically fallen without the scope of first amendment protection,
see id. at 482-85. See generally L. LEvY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO
JEFFERSON (1966).
"°See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1
(1961); American Communications Ass'n v. Doud, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). For a case
where the alleged national security interest did not outweigh freedom of the press, see
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
"See Barron, supra note 6; Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., No. 43,009
(Fla. July 18, 1973), appeal docketed 42 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1973) (No. 797).
"Frantz, supra note 24, at 1442-43.
[L]et us first be clear which balancing theory we are discussing. . ..
We are discussing the theory that the first amendment has no hard
core, that it protects not rights but "interests," that those "interests"
are to be weighed against "competing interests" on a case-to-case
basis and protected only when not found to be outweighed.
Id. at 1440.
'3See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
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statutes regulating press freedom valid out of deference to the legisla-
ture.4 That legislation regulating expression should benefit from this
judicial restraint seems particularly inappropriate, since the first
amendment45 was clearly designed to deny the legislature any power
to regulate the freedoms of speech or press. 6 Moreover, it is certain
that the "first amendment was proposed with the express expectation
and intention that the courts [and not the legislature] would enforce
it." 7 It would seem, therefore, that if the limitation on legislative
power set forth in the first amendment is to be effective, the legisla-
ture should not be charged with the final judgment as to the extent
of that limitation.
48
Through its weighing procedure and its deference to legislative
judgment, the balancing test provides courts with no substantive
doctrine to guide them in making decisions. Instead, the balancing
test leaves the first amendment devoid of concrete meaning, since
under that test the standards which measure an alleged infringement
of the first amendment differ with the facts of each case.49 The proce-
dure provides the courts with no doctrinal guidance as to when one
competing interest outweighs another. Weaknesses of the balancing
""Primary responsibility for adjusting the interests which compete in the situa-
tion before us of necessity belongs to the Congress .... We are to set aside the
judgment of those whose duty it is to legislate only if there is no reasonable basis for
it." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
5In pertinent part the amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom ... of the press ...." The first amendment is set forth in
full at note 1 supra. It applies to the states via the fourteenth amendment. Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
"Of Virginia's opposition to the Alien and Sedition Laws, James Madison wrote:
"[Tihe question does not turn ... on the wisdom of the Constitution .... It turns
on the actual meaning of the instrument; by which it has appeared, that a power over
the press is clearly excluded, from the number of powers delegated to the federal
government." Madison, The Virginia Report of 1799-1800, reprinted in L. LEvy, FREE-
DOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 220 (1966). "[Tihe liberty of conscience
and the freedom of the press, were equally and completely exempted from all authority
whatever of the United States." Id. at 227.
"Frantz, supra note 24, at 1448. Speaking of the Bill of Rights, Madison said:
If they are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals
of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians
of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every
assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will be
naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipu-
lated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights.
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 139 (1789). See generally Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 865 (1960) and Brant, The Madison Heritage, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 882 (1960).
'Frantz, supra note 24, at 1447-48.
'See EMERSON, supra note 20, at 53-56.
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test are especially apparent in cases involving access statutes, where
the statutory limitation upon the press' freedom to select its own copy
is itself allegedly designed to assure first amendment freedoms by
promoting "balanced" dissemination of information and opinion. 0 In
such cases the courts face the task of balancing the constitutional
right of freedom of the press against a statutorily created right of
freedom to the press, a weighing of the first amendment against itself
which the courts have consistently rejected."
Even assuming that the balancing test is the proper method for
determining the validity of access statutes,52 conscientious applica-
See Tornillo v. Miami Herald Pub. Co., No. 43,009 (Fla., July 18, 1973).
5In a Massachusetts decision handed down five days prior to Tornillo, wherein the
Supreme Judicial Court advised the senate that a law requiring that newspapers which
publish political advertisements for candidates must make equal space available for
opposing candidates' advertisements was an unconstitutional abridgement of the free-
dom of the press, the court stated:
The situation at which § 39A is directed may be the "monopolis-
tic" status of certain news publications. However, compulsion to pub-
lish all responsive political advertisements ... goes beyond what is
essential to the furtherance of any interest of a State in its citizens
having a right of access to newspapers in order to express, at their
expense, political ideas which otherwise would not be published ...
Indeed, no set of circumstances may exist which would support a
legislative mandate that a newspaper or other publication of general
circulation must publish a political advertisement.
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 298 N.E.2d 829, 835 (Mass. 1973) (footnote
omitted).
Similarly, in answering an assertion that the public interest demands that newspa-
pers should be required to fuel the flow of ideas by publishing all editorial advertise-
ments, the Seventh Circuit said recently:
We do not understand this to be the concept of freedom of the press
recognized in the First Amendment. The First Amendment guaran-
tees of free expression, oral or printed, exist for all-they need not be
purchased at the price amici would exact. The Union's right to free
speech does not give it the right to make use of the defendants' print-
ing presses and distribution systems without defendants' consent.
Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d
470, 478 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971).
See generally Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Com-
mittee, 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973); Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d
133 (9th Cir. 1971); Avins v. Rutgers, State Univ. of New Jersey, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968); Bloss v. Federated Publications, Inc., 380
Mich. 485, 157 N.W.2d 241 (1968).
52This assumption is considerably weakened by the specter of inconsistent deci-
sions regarding the constitutionality of such laws under the first amendment. For
example, it is asserted that
[t]he right of access might be an appropriate area for experimen-
tal, innovative legislation. The right to access problems of a small
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tion of the test would seem to require a detailed sifting of the facts
to determine whether the gravity and likelihood of repression of ideas
by the print media justifies regulation of the press. 3 However, recent
court decisions, purportedly utilizing the balancing test for review of
access legislaton, have not employed this type of factual analysis.
In a recent advisory opinion to the Massachusetts Senate concern-
ing a proposed statute providing a limited right of access for political
advertisements," the Massachusetts Supreme Court reached its con-
clusion without examining any data purporting to establish the re-
pressive nature of the modem, quasi-monopolistic press.5 Similarly,
the Florida court in Tornillo considered only the fact that the Miami
Herald was the largest newspaper in the state.56 Relying upon this
fact, coupled with the Herald's refusal to publish candidate Tornillo's
reply to an editorial, 7 the court boldly concluded that concentration
of media ownership was a threat to the "right of the public" to infor-
mation and had led to "private censorship. 58 There was no evidence
set forth in Tornillo, either in the opinion or in the briefs, of the
state dominated by a single city with a monopoly press will vary, for
example, from those of a populous state with many cities nourished
by many competing media.
Barron, supra note 6, at 1676. Compare Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., No.
43,009 (Fla. July 18, 1973), with Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 298 N.E.2d 829
(Mass. 1973) and Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Trib-
une Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971). Under a true
balancing test, these apparently conflicting opinions might all be correct, since differ-
ent degrees of repression ("evil") and responsibility ("improbability of evil") might
render regulation of press content appropriate in some jurisdictions and unwarranted
in others. Because "correct" decisions would not demand resolution in a higher forum,
balancing could result in jurisdictional differences in the amount of "freedom" enjoyed
by editors-the degree of discretion one could exercise in deciding whether to publish
political and other forms of protected speech might vary according to the locality.
While the "cultural federalism" lauded by Barron may be appropriate in carefully
limited situations involving unprotected forms of expression, such as obscenity, see
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the implications would be ominous if multiple
standards of fairness could justify selective compulsion of the press in the clearly
protected areas of expression.
OSee Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). The statement of the
balancing test found in Dennis is set forth in the text at note 37, supra.
41Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 298 N.E.2d 829 (Mass. 1973).
nIn fact there is little, if any, empirical support for either the assertion that
newspaper ownership trends cause an increase in private media repression of ideas or
the assertion that such repression is in fact widespread. See notes 98-99 and accompa-
nying text infra.
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specific dangers posed to freedom of speech by the Florida press. 9 No
statistics were presented to indicate that furtherance of the state
interest in a well-informed electorate was being stymied by monopol-
istic newspapers. From this conspicuous absence of empirical study,
it would seem that the court in Tornillo simply avoided the necessity
of a careful and difficult balancing procedure by deferring to the
"balancing" judgment of the legislature which had enacted the stat-
ute.60
Because the factual determinations involved are very difficult and
basically unsuited for judicial determination, 6 a court employing the
balancing test will often find itself of necessity framing its decision
in terms of policy and wisdom. The court will render its decision
without guidance from any firm core of doctrine found within the first
amendment. For this reason, the balancing test appears to be inap-
propriate in cases involving the constitutionality of right of reply or
access statutes. When the express terms of the first amendment are
balanced against a legislative or administrative conception of what
the amendment's "values" should require, the constitutional com-
mand expressed by those terms may be vitiated. 2 Indeed, the lan-
"Briefs examined include those of Appellant, Appellee, and amicus curiae, Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union of Florida. The articles which propose imposition of fairness
standards on the press do not catalog the patterns of private censorship which appar-
ently render a free mass media far more threatening than a governmentally regulated
one. See generally articles cited in note 6 supra.
Go It is a fundamental principle that this Court has the duty, if
reasonably possible, consistent with protection of constitutional
rights, to resolve all doubts as to the validity of a statute in favor of
its constitutionality and if reasonably possible a statute should be
construed so as not to conflict with the constitution. Courts are inc-
lined to adopt that reasonable interpretation of a statute which re-
moves it farthest from constitutional infirmity.
No. 43,009 (Fla., July 18, 1973) at 9 (footnote omitted).
"EMERSON, supra note 20, at 55.
2As Thomas Jefferson wrote, "Our peculiar security lies in the possession of a
written Constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction." 4 JEFFERSON,
WRITINGS 506 (Washington ed. 1859).
Two eminent authorities on first amendment analysis have written specifically of
the balancing test:
There is a fundamental logical and legal objection to "weighing"
a governmental objective, however legitimate and important that
objective may be, against a constitutional statement that the govern-
ment may not employ a certain means for the attainment of any of
its objectives.
Frantz, supra note 24, at 1441.
[Tihe lack of structure makes it realistically impossible for a court
to perform its difficult function of applying accepted and impartial
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guage of the first amendment prohibiting all laws which abridge free-
dom of the press clearly sets forth a limitation on the means which
may be employed in pursuit of the amendment's values. Thus, while
the balancing of conflicting objectives may be appropriate in some
instances, "it does not follow that any objective can ever be weighed
against an express limitation on the means available for its pur-
suit."
6 3
Perhaps due to the doctrinal uncertainties of a weighing of values,
the courts do not seem prepared to accept the balancing test as en-
tirely proper in cases where access to the press is involved." Even the
Florida court in Tornillo seemed reluctant to rest its decision squarely
on a weighing of interests. After discussing the competing interests
to be weighed and asserting that the freedom of the press is subordi-
nate to some superior right of the public to a full and balanced pres-
entation of information, the court based its decision in part on
grounds requiring no balancing whatever. The court simply resorted
to the express language of the first amendment and, by defining the
key terms "abridge" and "freedom of the press," concluded that the
right of reply statute did not "abridge" the "freedom of the press.
6 5
rules to hold in check the unruly forces that seek to destroy a system
of free expression.
EMERSON, supra note 20, at 54.
3Frantz, supra note 24, at 1441 (emphasis added).
"The Supreme Court has stated that, while the use of a public resource (the
airwaves) justifies a balancing of the public interest against the role of licensees as
"journalistic free agents" where the broadcast media are concerned,
[t]he power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own politi-
cal, social and economic views is bounded by only two factors: first,
the acceptance of a sufficient number of readers-and hence advertis-
ers-to assure financial success; and, second, the journalistic integrity
of its editors and publishers.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117
(1973). This would seem to indicate that with respect to newspapers and the other print
media the public interest is served by their very freedom and that a weighing process
should not be entertained.
lThe following language to this effect appears in the Tornillo opinion:
[B]elieving that this statute enhances rather than abridges freedom
of speech and press protected by the First Amendment, we hold that
it does not constitute a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States. ...
No. 43,009 (Fla., July 18, 1973) at 3;
The statute here under consideration is designed to add to the
flow of information and ideas and does not constitute an incursion
upon First Amendment rights or a prior restraint, since no specified
newspaper content is excluded. There is nothing prohibited but rather
it requires, in the interest of full and fair discussion, additional infor-
mation.
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B. An Alternative to the Balancing Test-The Defining Approach
and Its Application to Access Legislation
Although the Florida court's conception of the first amendment
terms "abridge" and "freedom of the press" appears questionable,"
the "defining" approach hinted at in Tornillo has received strong
support from first amendment scholars." Through judicial definition
of first amendment concepts, rather than case-by-case weighings of
facts, this method of analysis would encourage the development of
useful guidelines in the area of first amendment doctrine. A defining
approach would also recognize what the framers of the amendment
intended: that its language contains a core of absolute freedom of the
press."
A half free press would be deceptive to the public. Florida Statute
104.38, in the interest of all the people, provides that candidates for
public office under certain prescribed circumstances shall have a right
of reply, a right of expression. It does not deny to the owner of the
instruments of the newspaper industry any right of expression. The
statute assures, and does not abridge, the right of expression which
the First Amendment guarantees. The statute supports the freedom
of the press in its true meaning-that is, the right of the reader to the
whole story, rather than half of it-and without which the reader
would be "blacked out" as to the other side of the controversy.
For the foregoing reasons, we find [the Florida Statute] to be
constitutional ....
Id. at 12. For a discussion of the court's defining of the term "abridge," see notes 66-
89 and accompanying text infra.
"See text accompanying notes 81-89 infra. Those portions of the Tornillo opinion
set forth at note 65 supra, may represent an effort by the court therein to reconcile its
holding, reached through the rationale of the balancing test, with the express language
of the first amendment.
"See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 20; Frantz, supra note 24. Speaking of the devel-
opment of a theory of the first amendment, Emerson says:
Such a theory must start by accepting the prior judgment embodied
in the First Amendment. . . .The issue must be framed in terms of
ascertaining the area of expression which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment to protect, the kind of governmental action which consti-
tutes an infringement of that area, and the nature of ostensibly private
action which nevertheless carries the imprint of government authority
to such an extent that it, too, should be considered an exercise of state
power.
EMERSON, supra, at 115-16 (emphasis supplied).
"James Madison made it clear that the first amendment was intended to disable
the government within the scope of its protection, to create a protected area within
which the government had no power: "The right of freedom of speech is secured; the
liberty of the press is expressly declared to be beyond the reach of this government
. .. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 738 (1789). "[Ilt would seem scarcely possible to doubt
that no power whatever over the press was supposed to be delegated by the Constitu-
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This defining approach was apparently embraced in a recent Su-
preme Court decision, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commis-
sion on Human Relations.9 There the Court, although mentioning
the competing interests involved, rested its holding upon a definition
of the scope of the absolute "freedom of the press." In Pittsburgh
Press Co. a municipal human relations ordinance which prohibited
the publication of sex-designated advertising columns for non-
exempt job opportunities was held not to violate the publisher's first
amendment rights on the ground that the advertisements were purely
commercial in nature and consequently did not fall within the scope
of the first amendment "freedom of the press."70
As Pittsburgh Press Co. demonstrates, the scope of the absolute
freedom found within the first amendment is not, nor was it intended
to be, unlimited.7' Thus, expression by the press may be regulated
tion .... and that the amendment was intended as a positive and absolute reserva-
tion of it." 6 MADISON, WRITINGS 391 (Hunt ed. 1906). For a thorough exposition of his
views on the freedoms of speech and press see ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2 at 546.
The historical background of the amendment is discussed in Black, The Bill of Rights,
35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960) and Levy, Liberty and the First Amendment, 68 AM. HIST.
REv. 22 (1962).
-413 U.S. 376 (1973).
7nI Wie are not persuaded that either the decision to accept a commer-
cial advertisement which the advertiser directs to be placed in a sex-
designated column or the actual placement there lifts the newspaper's
actions from the category of commercial speech .... Nothing in a
sex-designated column heading sufficiently dissociates the designa-
tion from the want-ads placed beneath it to make the placement
severable for First Amendment purposes from the want-ads them-
selves. The combination ... is in practical effect an integrated com-
mercial statement.
Id. at 387-88. The Court's decision to refrain from balancing takes on added signifi-
cance when it is considered that the statute involved was not directed at the press per
se, but forbid ". . . any 'employer,' employment agency or labor organization to pub-
lish or circulate, or to cause to be published or circulated, any notice or advertisement
relating to 'employment' or membership which indicates any discrimination because
of ... sex." Id. at 378, quoting § 8(e) of the ordinance. The nature of the ordinance
would seem to bring it within the traditional ambit of the balancing test:
[Gleneral regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of
speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been
regarded as . . .[unconstitutional] ...when they have been found
justified by . ..governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitu-
tionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmen-
tal interest involved.
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50'51 (1961) (Harlan, J.). Thus Pittsburgh Press
Co. may signal a preference by the Court for an approach to first amendment questions
mapped out by an adherence to useful doctrinal guidelines.
"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-85 (1957); Beauharnais v.
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when it falls without the scope of the freedom of the press intended
to be protected by the first amendment.7" With respect to right of
reply or access statutes, then, the first question posed should be
whether the statute will affect expression which is within the proper
scope of the freedom of the press.
The access legislation proposed by Barron and other commenta-
tors 3 would be directed at speech on political and social issues, a form
of speech clearly meant to be protected by the first amendment.
7
Indeed, it would be the purpose of such statutes to compel the presen-
tation of more views and more issues. 75 The Florida statute76 and the
invalidated Massachusetts proposal 77 are of this general nature and,
although limited in their scope to political campaigns, involve the
same protected speech and the same constitutional issues as would a
more comprehensive scheme providing for access or reply in numer-
ous contexts.7 8 It should be specifically noted that such proposed
statutes would not be limited in scope to granting a right of reply to
victims of libel, a type of speech not protected by the first amend-
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255-57 (1952); EMERSON, supra note 20, at 56.
72A primary example is that of obscenity. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484-85 (1957). Another is that of "incitement to imminent lawless action." See, e.g.,
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
"See generally articles cited note 6, supra.
"Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957), quoted in relevant part at note
39 supra. See generally New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); EMERSON, supra note 20; H.
NELSON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT (1967).
" Barron, supra note 6. A typical assertion is the following: "Is it too bold to suggest
that it is necessary to ensure access to the mass media for unorthodox ideas in order
to make effective the guarantee against repression?" Id. at 1649.
76Note 13, supra.
"See note 51 supra. The fact that ideas are expressed in an advertisement does
not exclude them from the scope of first amendment protection unless they are purely
commercial in nature. The editorial discretion included in the freedom of press guaran-
tee would seem, therefore, to apply equally to the content of editorial advertisements
and regular editorial comments. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964); Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971);
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 298 N.E.2d 829 (Mass. 1973).
7 An issue possibly raised by statutes that compel the granting of free access to
the press and which would not be raised by a law requiring publication of paid adver-
tisements is that of deprivation of property without due process of law. While that
precise issue is not within the scope of this note, it seems likely that the first amend-
ment question will be dispositive in any event. If such a statute is found to be constitu-
tional, then it will probably withstand an assault based on deprivation on the ground
that it is a proper exercise of the police power. See Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing
Co., No. 43,009 (Fla., July 18, 1973) at 11 and cases cited therein.
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ment;5 neither would they infringe only upon the business activities
of the press which have no special immunity from the regulatory
legislation made necessary by a growing and complex economy."0 The
7 3This note will not deal with the constitutionality of statutes which might provide
for a right of reply, either outright or as an alternative to litigation, to libelous attacks
by the media. Since libel per se is not protected by the first amendment, such statutes
might be constitutional. However, the scope of the libel exception to the first amend-
ment-at least with respect to public officials, public figures, and events of public
interest-is very narrow; the~plaintiff must prove "knowing or reckless falsity," though
he need not prove malice:
[I1 will toward the plaintiff, or bad motives, are not elements of the
New York Times standard. That standard requires only that the
plaintiff prove knowing or reckless falsity. That burden, and no more,
is the plaintiff's whether "public official," "public figure," or "little
man." It may be that jury instructions that are couched only in terms
of knowing or reckless falsity and omit reference to "actual malice,"
would further a proper application of the New York Times standard
of evidence.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 52 n.18 (1971).
The Supreme Court has mentioned the possibility of ensuring the "ability to re-
spond" to libel. Id. at 47. However, in a footnote which gives cautious recognition to
the "Barron thesis," the Supreme Court has hinted that statutes compelling the press
to print replies, especially to statements which though critical and unjust do not
constitute libel, may encounter the same "chilling effect" objections which spawned
the New York Times standard: "A constitutional rule that deters the press from
covering the ideas or activities of the private individual thus conceives the individual's
interest too narrowly." Id. at 47 n.15. Just such a rule might be an upholding of the
constitutionality of a general right of reply to criticism.
The New York Times standard originated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964). Cases applying the New York Times standard include Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971);
and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Articles discussing the reply
problem with respect to libel include Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to
an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L. REV. 867 (1948); Note, Vindication of the Reputation of
a Public Official, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1730 (1967). The right of reply as an alternative to
voluntary retractions or libel suits is also discussed in I Z. CHAFFEE, GOVERNMENT AND
MASS COMMUNICATIONS 138 (1947); and THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A
FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 86 (1947) [hereinafter cited as A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE
PRESS].
-'See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 382 (1973). The press is not immune to either the National Labor Relations Act,
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937), or the Fair Labor Standards Act,
Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946), Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
Also applicable to the press is the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). The dicta in this case concerning the public interest
in the free flow of information, and the assertion that the first amendment does not
sanction the repression of that interest by private combinations, id. at 20, have been
seized upon by the advocates of right of reply and access statutes as establishing the
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statutes clearly involve the editorial freedom of the press with respect
to protected press content.
As right of reply or access legislation applies to the specific form
of freedom of the press protected by the first amendment, the consti-
tutionality of such legislation will turn upon whether the statute in
question "abridges" that freedom of the press. The term "abridge"
has normally been employed with reference to attempts by the state
to compel exclusion of press content, and such "prior restraints" have
consistently been declared unconstitutional by the courts.," A statu-
tory right of reply or access has a different but no less compulsory
effect upon the editorial freedom of the press in that it requires the
inclusion of press content. The question then is whether legislation
compelling inclusion of press content, like that compelling exclusion
of such content, is a restraint upon or an abridgement of freedom of
the press.
Barron has suggested that the question is too "wooden and for-
mal" when couched in terms of whether a statute requiring inclusion
of press content is a restraint upon the freedom of the press.8 2 He
proposes a more "sensitive" inquiry as to whether the statute pro-
hibits or provides for expression.8 This tack was adopted by the
Florida court in Tornillo when it found that the statute considered
did not constitute "an incursion upon first amendment rights" be-
cause no specified newspaper content was excluded,4 but rather addi-
general proposition that the "public interest" should override the freedom of the press
in other situations as well. Barron, supra note 6, at 1654. Indeed, the AP decision is
criticized for reflecting "a romantic view of the first amendment" because it "assumes
... the 'freedom to publish' absent a combination of publishers." Id.
In a footnote to its remark that repression of information flow by private combina-
tions is not protected by the first amendment, the Court makes it clear that "Ithe
decree does not compel AP or its members to permit publication of anything which
their 'reason' tells them shall not be published. It only provides that after their 'reason'
has permitted publication of news, they shall not, for their own financial advantage,
unlawfully combine to limit its publication." 326 U.S. at 20 n.18. Thus it would seem
that private newspapers, not acting in combination to restrain trade, may not have
their content regulated via the antitrust laws.
Barron also asserts that monopolistic newspapers may be regulated in the absence
of a combination through the "public function" theory. Barron, supra note 6, at 1669.
For a discussion of this proposition see notes 145-51 and accompanying text infra.
"See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
"'Barron, supra note 6, at 1673.
'Id.
"It is interesting that, although compelled publication of additional information
is an "affirmative" imposition in the sense that it does not require exclusion of content
specified by the state, it may in effect be tantamount to a "negative" or censorial
requirement. This effect may result because the amount of non-advertising space in a
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tional content was required "in the interest of full and fair discus-
sion." 15 The shortcoming of this approach, however desirable its sen-
sitivity, is that in its quest to avoid woodenness and formality, it also
avoids the proper inquiry to be made of the statute. The approach
transforms the examination from one of whether or not "freedom"
has been "abridged" into one of whether content has been forcibly
increased or forcibly decreased.
The cases are few in which the courts have considered the consti-
tutionality of compelling publication, but they indicate that such a
requirement is as much an abridgement of freedom as prohibiting
publication. In three cases which have reached the circuit court level,
the courts have agreed that compelling publication is an abridgement
of the freedom of the press. 6 The Ninth Circuit, after rejecting the
contention "that the courts or any other governmental agency should
dictate the contents of a newspaper," concluded that "[t]here is no
difference between compelling publication of material that the news-
paper wishes not to print and prohibiting a newspaper from printing
news or other material. ' 8 This appears consistent with Supreme
Court statements opposing legislative regulation of the expression of
ideas.8 The conclusion seems entirely logical, since, whether publica-
tion is compelled or prohibited, freedom is abridged when the state
makes a decision which in the absence of regulation would have been
made by an editor.
With respect to statements by political candidates, for example,
the validity of the conclusion that compelling publication of such
newspaper-space devoted to news and other features-is predetermined. Thus a're-
quirement that additional matter be printed would, in practical effect, require that
some other matter be displaced or excluded in order for the newspaper to avoid finan-
cial injury. Interview with Paxton Davis and J. K. Jennings, Professors of Journalism
at Washington and Lee University, in Lexington, Virginia, Oct. 5, 1973.
'No. 43,009 (Fla., July 18, 1973) at 6. See note 65, supra.
"Chicago Joint Bd., Alamgamted Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435
F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); Associates & Aldrich Co.
v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971); Avins v. Rutgers, State Univ. of New
Jersey, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
'Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 1971).
The Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), a case
involving the broadcast media, chose not to rest its decision upon the argument that
"Congress does not abridge freedom of speech or press by legislation directly or indi-
rectly multiplying the voices and views presented to the public through time sharing,
fairness doctrines, or other devices which limit or dissipate the power of those who sit
astride the channels of communication with the general public." Id. at 401 n.28.
mSee, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376 (1973); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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statements is an abridgement of press freedom may be simply dem-
onstrated. Where there is no regulation, the first amendment ensures
to a newspaper the privilege either to publish or not to publish the
statement of any political candidate, and the exercise of that privi-
lege with respect to any one candidate has no effect upon the newspa-
per's identical privilege with respect to that candidate's opponent.
However, when a right of reply or access statute is enacted, providing
that the opposing candidates must be given equal space, then the
exercise of the privilege to publish with respect to one candidate
creates a duty with respect to that candidate's opponent or oppo-
nents. The statutory imposition of a duty to publish where there had
been a privilege either to publish or not to publish, whatever its
desirability, is clearly an abridgement of the freedom of the press.
In view of the preceding discussion, it would seem that a careful
defining of first amendment concepts reveals that statutory compul-
sion of publication abridges the freedom of the press. Right of reply
or access statutes which contemplate such compulsion of the print
media, such as the Florida law upheld in Tornillo,89 should therefore
be declared unconstitutional.
COMPETING INTERESTS AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF ACCESS LEGISLATION
Whatever the grounds for their holdings, however, the courts in
first amendment cases have been wont to balance relevant considera-
tions of policy and public interest.9" This has been done despite both
the weaknesses of the balancing technique" and recent indications by
the Supreme Court that it is cognizant of these flaws and is disen-
chanted with the technique.92 The judicial weighing of policy consid-
"'See note 13, supra.
"Considerations of policy and public interest have been entertained even though
the cases were decided upon much narrower grounds. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
" See text accompanying note 36-63 supra.
"In Pittsburgh Press Co., a five-to-four decision, the majority emphasized the
narrow scope of the holding and concluded by stating emphatically that it did not
authorize any restriction, whatever, whether of content or layout, on
stories or commentary originated by Pittsburgh Press, its columnists,
or its contributors. On the contrary, we reaffirm unequivocally the
protection afforded to editorial judgment and to the free expression of
views on these and other issues, however controversial.
413 U.S. at 391 (emphasis added).
In spite of the ample caution of the majority, the dissent, interestingly composed
of Justices Burger, Douglas, Stewart, and Blackmun, expressed great concern over the
prospective impact of the decision upon the scope of the freedom of the press, id. at
2562 (Bruger, C.J.), and seemed to reject strongly any invasion of the absolute freedom
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erations in cases involving access legislation involves an assessment
of the policy surrounding the first amendment, of the nature and
magnitude of the "evil" threatening that policy, and of the implica-
tions of the enactment of right of reply or access statutes as a remedy
for that "evil."
The framers of the Constitution believed that political freedom
requires an editorially free press, since no freedom would be secure
where men could not readily convey their thoughts to one another.9 3
It was believed that a well-informed public would best discharge the
responsibilities of citizenship and that, to this end, free and robust
debate on significant issues was essential.94 The risks involved in the
guaranteeing of such rights were acknowledged; the potential abuses
by a free press of its responsibilities were accepted as a small price
for a firm shield against tyranny. Recognizing that the press in some
instances would be unjust, partisan, and even cruel, a grant to it of
complete freedom was, nonetheless, felt to be the best means for
achieving widespread dissemination of information and debate and
for assessing the merits of public officials and public policy. 5 These
of the press in the name of public interest. These dissents, especially when read in light
of the very cautious expansion of the definition of commercial speech by the majority,
seem to evidence a distinct tendency to reject the weighing of the first amendment in
the balance with any public interest, on the basis that as long as the amendment is
viewed "as no more than a set of 'values' to be balanced against other 'values,' that
Amendment will remain in grave jeopardy." Id. at 402 (Stewart, J., joined by Douglas
and in pertinent part by Blackmun). See also note 59 supra.
3See, e.g., ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 569-71; L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON (1966); H. NELSON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM
HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT (1967); Levy, Liberty and the First Amendment, 68
AM. HIST. REv. 22 (1962).
"See, e.g., A FRzE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS, supra note 79, at 6; ELUOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 2, at 569-71.
"Emerson speaks of "the framework of the basic decision made in adopting the
First Amendment." EMERSON, supra note 20, at 59. Moreover, Justice Black spoke of
the choice of a free press as the means to the end of a well-informed citizenry as follows:
Of course the decision to provide a constitutional safeguard...
involves a balancing of conflicting interests. . . . [T]he framers
themselves did this balancing when they wrote the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights. They appreciated the risks involved and they de-
cided that certain rights should be guaranteed regardless of those
risks.
Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865, 879 (1960).
As to the irresponsibility of the press, Madison said, "Some degree of abuse is
inseparable from the proper use of everything; and in no instance is this more true than
in that of the press." ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 571. The Hutchins Commission
said that "[flreedom of the press to appeal to reason may always be construed as
freedom of the press to appeal to public passion and ignorance, vultarity and cynicism.
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concepts of first amendment objectives-of what freedom of the press
is designed to accomplish-appear to have retained their vitality
almost two centuries later.96
It is now suggested that, in light of modern economic and techno-
logical advances, these very goals are threatened by the power of the
private media. In Tornillo the Supreme Court of Florida described
the alleged danger:
The right of the public to know all sides of a controversy
and from such information to be able to make an enlightened
choice is being jeopardized by the growing concentration of the
ownership of the mass media into fewer and fewer hands, re-
sulting ultimately in a form of private censorship. Through
consolidation, syndication, acquisition of radio and television
stations and the demise of vast numbers of newspapers, com-
petition is rapidly vanishing and news corporations are acquir-
ing monopolistic influence over huge areas of the country.
9 7
Although the position of the Florida Supreme Court is plausible, no
attempt was made through presentation of statistical data or other-
wise to demonstrate that there is a significant degree of private cen-
sorship as a result of ownership trends in the print media; in fact, the
As freedom of the press is always in danger, so it is always dangerous." A FREE AND
RFSPONSIBLE PRESS, supra note 79, at 7.
The Supreme Court has recently recognized the value of editorial discretion and
the acceptability of the inevitable abuses thereof:
For better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is
selection and choice of material. That editors . . . can and do abuse
this power is beyond doubt, but that is no reason to deny the discre-
tion Congress provided. Calculated risks of abuse are taken in order
to preserve higher values. The presence of these risks is nothing new;
the authors of the Bill of Rights accepted the reality that these risks
were evils for which there was no acceptable remedy other than a spirit
of moderation and a sense of responsibility-and civility-on the part
of those who exercise the guaranteed freedoms of expression.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124-25
(1973) (emphasis added).
"The goals of the first amendment are endorsed even by those who disagree over
the means which the Constitution allows for their pursuit. See, e.g., Barron, supra note
6, at 1648; Daniel, Right of Access to Mass Media-Government Obligation to Enforce
First Amendment?, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 783 (1970). For discussions of these goals by the
Supreme Court, see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1 (1945).
"No. 43,009 (Fla., July 18, 1973) at 6. The statement adequately synopsizes the
description of the "evil" offered by Barron and other commentators. See articles cited
note 6, supra.
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available evidence seems to indicate the contrary." Thus, a real but
"The decline in the number of daily newspapers ended almost thirty years ago,
as the following table indicates:












American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, Facts About Newspapers-1973.
The number of daily newspapers rose rapidly during the late nineteenth century,
from 850 in 1880 to a peak of 2,200 in 1910. While the number of such newspapers has
decreased only 20 percent since 1919, daily circulation has almost tripled. There has
been a distinct trend to metropolitan monopolies, with the percentage of cities served
by a single daily newspaper increasing from 42 percent (509 cities) in 1910 to 85 percent
(1,284 cities) by 1969. In addition newspapers comprising 58 percent of the total daily
circulation are owned by groups or chains consisting of two or more newspapers. There
are, however, 159 such groups, of which only 16 account for as much as 1 percent of
the total daily circulation. The largest such group, which owns the Chicago Tribune
and the New York Daily News, accounts for only 6 percent of the total daily circula-
tion. EMERY, AULT, & AGEE, supra note 3, at 132-36. The figures do not indicate the
number of competitive situations involving newspapers from different cities which
serve the same general area, nor do they assess the competitive significance of the
approximately 9,400 weekly newspapers. Id. at 156. The decrease in competition is
significant with respect to newspapers, but the figures above do not reflect the status
of competition in the mass media in general.
A more accurate criterion for competition is that of "media voices," which includes
the separately owned instruments of local mass communication of both the broadcast
and print media. There are 5,079 media voices in 1,500 cities; and, of these, 4,879 are
separately owned competing voices in 1,298 cities. Only 202 cities of the 1,500 are
without competing media voices, and most of these are suburbs with access to city
voices. When the more accurate "media voice" criterion is employed, it appears fair
to conclude that there is now more competition than there was in 1910. Id. at 133-34.
No evidence has been found to indicate any increase in the amount of "private
censorship" by the press or even that such censorship exists to any significant degree.
Although the editorial columns hopefully give a vigorous presentation of the editor's
views, it is supposedly regarded as an "article of faith" among journalists that the news
will not be slanted. RIVERS & SCHRAMM, RESPONSIBILITY IN MASS COMMUNICATION 2-3,
49 (1969). Indeed, in order to avoid charges of political bias, some newspapers have
measured their coverage of candidates to ensure that by election day rivals have been
given equal coverage in column inches and photographs and equal front-page treat-
ment. EMERY, AULT, & AGEE, supra note 3, at 121. See also the remarks by Arthur H.
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moderate trend toward centralization of press ownership, coupled
with a correspondingly increased potential for private censorship by
each owner,99 is said to threaten the full and fair dissemination of
ideas and information in our society to the extent that the protection
of these first amendment goals justifies the enactment of right of
reply or access statutes applicable to the print media.
A consideration of whether there is a justification for such stat-
utes, which would to some degree regulate press content, necessarily
involves an examination not only of the "evil" those statutes are
designed to remedy but also of the implications of the statutes them-
selves. Regulation of the press in order to curb its abuses has hereto-
fore been rejected as a greater evil than the abuses themselves. 0 The
innovative right of reply or access statutes deserve careful scrutiny
as to their potential detrimental effect upon freedom of the press and
their precedential implications for more pervasive press regulation.
As statutes granting a right of reply to either editorials or adver-
tisements do not become operative unless a prior publication acti-
vates the statutory right, such statutes might produce a "chilling
effect" upon the press.'0' For example, a newspaper strongly opposing
Sulzburger to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1947, urging fair reporting
and responsibility by the press, reprinted in H. NELSON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM
HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT 411 (1967). On editorial bias, and the media's efforts
to promote fair and responsible reporting, see EMERY, AULT & AGEE, supra note 3, at
121-22, 145-49.
9 There are no indications that the incidence of "abuses" is increasing either, if,
indeed, such abuses are distinct from "private censorship." See notes 95 and 98 supra.
"'It was evident long before the ratification of the first amendment that abuse of
press freedom was greatly preferred to regulation of the press. Writing in The Pennsyl-
vania Gazette in 1737, John Alexander said the following about the irresponsibility of
the press:
These abuses of Freedom of Speech are the excresences of Liberty.
They ought to be suppressed; but to whom dare we commit the care
of doing it? An evil Magistrate entrusted with a POWER to punish
Words is armed with a WEAPON the most destructive and terrible.
Under pretense of pruning off the exuberant branches, he frequently
destroys the tree.
H. LEvY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 62-63 (1966). James Madi-
son agreed:
Among those principles deemed sacred in America. . . there is no one
of which the importance is more deeply impressed on the public mind
than the liberty of the press. That this liberty is often carried to excess
. . . is seen and lamented, but the remedy has not yet been
discovered.
6 MADISON, WRITINGS 336 (Hunt ed. 1906). For a recent affirmation of this principle,
see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 51 (1971).
"'See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 298 N.E.2d 829 (Mass. 1973):
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the publication of replies, and yet facing prosecution if it refuses to
publish them, might simply decide to avoid publication of any mate-
rial which would activate the right of reply. Presumably, therefore, a
right of reply statute would have a chilling effect on those very sub-
ject areas in which the right of reply is granted. It follows that if "full
and fair discussion" is sought on a broad range of issues, there might
conceivably be no discussion of any of the issues where a newspaper
desires to avoid the effect of the statute."°2 Thus, irrespective of prob-
lems of administration, 1 3 a right of reply statute could have an ex-
actly opposite result from that which is intended, and that effect may
be in direct proportion to the scope of the statute. It must be noted,
however, that the Supreme Court was not persuaded by "chilling
"[Ilts enactment, instead of achieving a fairer dissemination of political advertising,
may produce the chilling effect of discouraging newspapers and the other affected
publications from accepting any political advertisements." Id. at 833-34.
10Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 487, 499 (1969). Barron acknowledges this possibility as supportive of
his assertion that access should be granted outright rather than only in reply to the
editorial views or topical articles appearing in the print media.
"*The problems of administration would be substantial. Senator Dill's remarks on
why the Senate rejected an "access" amendment to the Communications Act of 1934
indicated some of the practical difficulties:
If we should provide that 25 percent of time shall be allocated to
nonprofit organizations, someone would have to determine-Congress
or somebody else-how much of the 25 percent should go to education,
how much of it to labor, how much of it to fraternal organizations, and
so forth. When we enter this field we must determine how much to
give to the Catholics probably and how much to the Protestants and
how much to the Jews.
78 CONG. REC. 8843 (1934), quoted in Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 108-09 n.4 (1973). See also Daniel, Right of Access
to Mass Media-Government Obligation to Enforce First Amendment?, 48 TExAs L.
REv. 783 (1970).
Daniel discusses the administrative problems of determining who is to be allowed
to reply and wonders if hate groups would be given equal access with those advocating
amiable relations among the races. Although his approach is largely rhetorical, the
problem is a serious one. Statutes which affect "any newspaper" could, for example,
require Catholic newspapers to print the arguments of those favoring abortion; and,
the potential for political abuse through an administrative agency could be legion. The
network media have recently felt, whether justifiably or not, that they were being
subjected to such political pressure. See EMERY, AULT & AGEE, supra note 3, at 136
(1970). In any event, "extraordinarily difficult problems would arise in attempting to
administer the basic principle of equality to minority groups, to new groups being
formed, to individuals not sharing the viewpoint of any group, to 'crackpots,' and so
on." EMERSON, supra note 20, at 111. See also Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine
in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L.
RFv. 1, 72-93 (1973).
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effect" objections to regulation of the broadcast media." Whatever
the validity of such objections where the print media are concerned,
the danger posed to a free press by any "chilling effect" of right of
reply or access statutes does not seem as great as the danger of in-
creasingly pervasive press regulation which such statutes present.
The breadth of the statute with respect to those persons and
groups entitled to access or to reply and the subject areas in which
access or reply would be appropriate is an open-ended matter from a
constitutional standpoint. Although expansion of the statute's scope
might be opposed on policy grounds such as the difficulty of adminis-
tration,35 the asserted constitutional principle of requiring full and
fair discussion in order to promote the goals of the first amendment,
once approved, would be the same regardless of the scope of the law. 06
The state legislatures or the Congress could, then, through giving
right of reply or access laws increasingly wider application, ensure
"fairness" and satisfy the public "need to know" with respect to a
broad range of subject areas and institutions. For example, expansion
of a basic reply or access statute might permit an enforcement agency
to "balance" press content through regulation of access to the press
by public officials and organizations, diverse political and socio-
economic groups, and various governmental and industrial institu-
tions. 107 Through such statutory guarantees the goal of the advocates
of governmentally enforced general access to the press-that the
media "should not be allowed to resist controls designed to promote
vigorous debate and expression by cynical reliance on the first
amendment"3 58-would be achieved.
The realization of this goal, whatever its initial therapeutic
value, 0 1 would harbor grave implicatons for the continued existence
of an editorially free press. The Commission on Freedom of the Press
" Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969).
" See note 103, supra.
O"'See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 379 (1969) noting
that the requirement that the broadcast media be operated in the public interest
authorized the promulgation of various reply and equal time regulations. To extend
the scope of regulations would require merely an expanded definition of the public
"need" which created them.
"'A "general access" approach of this nature is contemplated by Barron in his
articles. See note 6 supra.
"'Barron, supra note 6, at 1663.
"'As there is no appreciable evidence of the widespread "repression of ideas"
proclaimed by the advocates of access statutes, see articles cited note 6 supra, it is
likely that such a law would have little salutary effect other than that the press would
be compelled to publish that which the administrators of the law felt the public should
know.
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noted in 1947 that "[tihe necessity of finding some way . .. of
controlling the concentration of power associated with modern indus-
try will always make it look as though turning over all problems to
the government would easily solve them.""' 0 The Commission warned
that this tendency posed a great potential danger to the freedom of
the press, since, by making the responsible use of freedom legally
compulsory, it would permit the self-control of the press to be su-
perceded by a mechanism."'
The implementation of right of reply or access statutes, through
whatever administrative mechanism is established for their enforce-
ment, could change the complexion of the press and, in so doing,
change its content. For example, every article or editorial dealing
with an issue for which a right of reply is provided would require the
reservation of an equal or even greater amount of equally conspicuous
space for the reply."2 Similarly, a reservation of space would be re-
quired by statutes providing a general right of access to individuals
or institutions determined by some administrative procedure to be
entitled to such access. The provision of reply or access space would,
in turn, presumably displace an equal amount of material which
might otherwise have been published."' A comprehensive right of
reply statute could, therefore, conceivably have the effect of eliminat-
ing some or all articles on topics not subject to reply if the replies
themselves consumed a sufficient amount of space. Comprehensive
general access statutes could have the same effect without any requir-
ment of a prior publication to "trigger" the grant of space. For exam-
ple, if the newspapers in Washington, D.C., were required under a
general access statute to print the Congressional Record, there might
be little space remaining for vigorous coverage of other news." 4
"'A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS, supra note 79, at 4.
"'Id. at 10-11. "[L]iberty of the press is in peril as soon as the government tries
to compel what is to go into a newspaper." II Z. CHAFFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS
COMMUNICATIONS 633 (1947).
"2The reply space would be equal if only one group or person were entitled to reply.
Double or triple space might be required in a primary campaign, or in discussion of a
multi-faceted public issue.
'See note 84 supra. This statement assumes the absence of further regulation by
the government respecting the amount of total space to be devoted to news and other
coverage.
'"Any agency charged with administering the allocation of access to the press
would also be subject to political pressure. The power to determine, for the purpose of
insuring "fair" coverage, who receives access to what amount of column space would
surely be coveted by public officials under fire from the media. Successful attempts
to influence an agency's decisions as to what subjects or spokesmen merit access, or
as to what presentation of views is "fair," would give embattled officials much more
1974]
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Thus, compelling the inclusion of content could, if carried to its
logical extreme, become control of content, whether by displacement
or more direct administrative action. It is inescapable that the gov-
ernment has an abiding interest in disseminating selected informa-
tion to the public, and it spends more for this purpose than all of the
major media combined."' It is equally inescapable that right of reply
or access statutes contemplate some governmental determination, as
opposed to determination by the editors and publishers of a free
press, of what the public needs to know."6 The gravest implication
of these statutes lies in this creation of power in the government to
make determinations relating to the content of the press.
The grant of this power would not seem to be justified by any great
likelihood that its exercise would be responsible and benevolent. Any
abuse by the government of a power to ensure access would have a
far more pervasive effect than abuses by owners of even the largest
newspaper groups." 7 More importantly, in times of stress and emer-
leverage against the press than less direct methods of influencing the media. In recent
times the fact that use of the Internal Revenue Service, the Justice Department's
Antitrust Division, and the Federal Communications Commission to harass critical
news organizations has been considered at high levels of government, is itself a compel-
ling reason why legislation providing for more direct press regulation should be
avoided. See NEWSWEEK, Nov. 12, 1973, at 87; TIME, Nov. 12, 1973, at 85.
"'In addition to the obvious power of high officials to make their views
known-especially through the mass media-by 1967 the federal gov-
ernment was spending more than $400 million a year on public rela-
tions and public information. The Executive branch, in fact, spends
more on publicity . . . than is spent to operate the entirety of the
Legislative and Judicial branches. All together, federal expenditures
on telling and showing the taxpayer are more than double the com-
bined costs of news gathering by the two major U. S. wire services, the
three major television networks, and the ten largest American
newspapers.
RIVERS & SCHRAMM, RESPONSIBILITY IN MASS COMMUNICATION 97 (1969) (emphasis
added).
"'See articles cited in note 6 supra. Indeed, the proposed purpose of such statutes
is to remove the power of editorial discretion from the editors so that it may be "more
fairly exercised." Barron has given a possible rationale for the superior right of govern-
ing majorities to make editorial decisions:
Indeed, nongoverning minorities in control of the means of communi-
cation should perhaps be inhibited from restraining free speech (by
the denial of access to their media) even more than governing
majorities are restrained by the first amendment-minorities do not
have the mandate which a legislative majority enjoys in a polity oper-
ating under a theory of representative government.
Barron, supra note 6, at 1656 (emphasis added).
"'Abuses of editorial power by even the largest newspaper chain would affect only
6 percent of the daily circulation. See note 98 supra. Abuses by the government of a
NOTES AND COMMENTS
gency, such a statute or statutes might provide the government with
an expedient mechanism by which the flow of accurate information
could be impeded or distorted if, for example, the public's "need to
know" was determined to be very narrow or the government's right
of access to the press was so broadened as to become exclusive.
5
1
From the foregoing discussion it would seem that the questionable
benefits of right of reply or access legislation are far outweighed by
the negative implications of such statutes for a free press. Therefore,
even an analysis based upon the balancing of the interests involved
should result in a determination that such statutes are constitution-
ally infirm.
THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE PuBLIc FUNCTION THEORY: REGULA-
TION BY ANALOGY?
Various commentators have suggested that a right of reply or
access to the print media may be guaranteed by an extension to such
media of the "fairness doctrine" of the Federal Communications
Commission"' or, alternatively, by a determination that newspapers
are impressed with a public function and therefore must serve all on
an equal basis.' 0 An assessment of the validity of these assertions
involves an examination of the rationales underlying the respective
approaches to regulation of expression and a determination of
whether either rationale justifies limited regulation of the print
media.
The fairness doctrine currently applicable to the broadcast media
evolved due to the inherent physical limitations of the frequency
federally administered right of reply or access statute would affect all newspapers.
There is no reason to believe that a discretion which is occasionally abused in the
private sector would not be abused if exercised by government, and the danger inherent
in the latter form of abuse totally eclipses the sporadic frustration caused by the
former.
"'Justice Black has said that the great danger of allowing the government to
measure the first amendment rights by a weighing of the public interest is that, in
times of emergency and strife, it gives the government power to do what it chooses to
protect itself without regard for individual rights merely by redefining the public
interests. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865, 878 (1960). The govern-
ment's ability to supplant the private media in such a situation should not be doubted.
See note 115 supra.
"'See, e.g., articles by Barron cited note supra; Note, Monopoly Newspapers:
Troubles in Paradise, 7 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 268, 284-85 (1970).
InBarron, supra note 6, at 1669. See, e.g., Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clo-
thing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 973 (1971).
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spectrum.'' Prior to 1927 there was no governmentally regulated fre-
quency allocation, and in the absence of such allocation chaos was
prevalent. 22 This chaos was attributable to the very nature of the
broadcast media. The broadcast media were, and still are, limited-
access media-only a finite number of stations may broadcast simul-
taneously without interfering with one another.' 23 In the absence of
regulation, there was a "cacophony of competing voices, none of
which could be clearly and predictably heard."''2 4 In 1927 the Federal
Radio Commission, the predecessor of the F.C.C., was established to
allocate broadcast frequencies among competing applicants in a
manner responsive to the public "convenience, interest, or necess-
ity."' - The Commission limited the number of broadcast stations, so
that those stations broadcasting could be clearly heard without inter-
ference from competing stations attempting to use the same fre-
quency. 22 Hence, the limited regulation of the broadcast media was
For thorough discussions of the development of the fairness doctrine and of
broadcast regulation in general, see Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm. 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
The fairness doctrine has evolved through decisions of the F.C.C. and has been
applied by denial of license renewals and construction permits. The twofold duty it
imposes is described in the Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C.
1246 (1949). It requires that the broadcaster give adequate coverage to public issues,
United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945), and that the coverage given fairly
report opposing viewpoints.
The fairness doctrine is complemented by regulations providing for a right of reply
to personal attacks and political editorials. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679
(1973) (all identical).
Distinct from the fairness doctrine is the statutory requirement that equal time be
provided to candidates for public office. 47 U.S.C. § 315, implemented by 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.120, 73.290, 73.590, 73.657 (1973) (all identical). However,
[in terms of constitutional principle, and as enforced sharing of a
scarce resource, the personal attack and political editorial rules are
indistinguishable from the equal time provision § 315, a specific en-
actment of Congress requiring stations to set aside reply time under
certain circumstances and to which the fairness doctrine and these
constituent regulations are important complements.
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 391. Because the constitutional rationale
is the same with respect to the doctrine and the various regulations, it is assumed that,
if applicable to the press at all, they would be equally applicable.
'22Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1969).
alSee, e.g., id. at 376; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
211 (1943).
2'Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969).
1'Radio Act of 1927, § 4, 44 Stat. 1170, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970). See
also, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 309, 315, 326 (1970).
2'See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390-91 (1969); Na-
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seen to be necessary and was permitted by the Supreme Court in the
case of National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,'27 only due to the
unique nature of those media as a means of communication:
"[u]nlike other modes of expression, [the broadcast media]
inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic,
and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to
governmental regulation."'2
The existence of governmental regulation has led to the view that
the airwaves are a public resource, whose ownership is held in the
public domain.2 9 However, concomitant with the governmental
power to regulate the use of this scarce resource through allocation
of frequencies arises the responsibility to ensure that the broadcast
media be used in the public interest, without censorship of divergent
views.' 30 To fulfill this responsibility, the government has imple-
mented the fairness doctrine, and the personal attack and political
editorial regulations which complement that doctrine.' 3' Thus, the
fairness doctrine has developed only because of the recognized necess-
ity of governmental regulation of the broadcast media, which in turn
is based solely upon the physical limitations existent within that
tional Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1943).
'319 U.S. 190 (1945).
"Id. at 226. Elsewhere in its opinion, the Court elaborated on this unique charac-
teristic of the broadcast media as a means of communication:
[Ilts facilities are limited; they are not available to all who may wish
to use them; the radio spectrum simply is not large enough to accom-
modate everybody. There is a fixed natural limitation upon the num-
ber of stations that can operate without interfering with one another.
Regulation of radio was therefore as vital to its development as traffic
control was to the development of the automobile.
Id. at 213.
'"See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 101, 117-18 (1973).
' "The unique nature of the broadcast media, which places them beyond the scope
of the "press" given absolute freedom by the first amendment and requires their
regulation, renders appropriate a balancing of the interests of the broadcast licensees
against the public interest in the use of the airwaves. See, e.g., id; Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190 (1943). Indeed, "failure on the part of the FCC to require a fair presentation
of all issues would give the Government the power of a censor, for the Government
could select licensees on the basis of its preference for their demonstrated political
view, and could foreclose access to the media for all those whose views it disapproved."
Marks, Broadcasting and Censorship: First Amendment Theory After Red Lion, 38
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 974, 992 (1970) (emphasis added). As the government does not and
cannot license newspapers, it has no such potential to act as a censor with respect to
the print media, and the rationale for the above balancing of interests does not apply.
'21See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390-92 (1969).
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particular means of communication. With regard to the print media,
on the other hand, there exist no such physical limitations and there-
fore no initial basis for governmental intervention. 32 Hence, the anal-
ogy between the print media and the broadcast media is plausible but
inapposite and an extension of the fairness doctrine based upon such
an analogy would be subject to serious constitutional objections.
Nevertheless, Barron has asserted that the Supreme Court de-
cision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,'1 which upheld the
constitutionality of the F.C.C.'s fairness doctrine, departed from the
limited-access rationale supporting regulation of the broadcast
media.13 He contends that Red Lion opened the way for the adoption
of a new rationale anchored in a "first amendment-based theory of
access," which takes into account not only physical limitations upon
access, but also economic limitations which have led to a concentra-
tion of ownership of the media in the hands of a decreasing number
of corporate entities. 3 5 Thus, he concludes that a fairness doctrine
''Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
117 (1973). The economic difficulties of establishing a newspaper do not render the
print media a limited access media so as to necessitate or justify governmental regula-
tion. Indeed, the broadcasters in Red Lion challenged the limited-access theory
through an analogy to newspapers. In explaining why the analogy should fail, one
commentator has said:
There are today far fewer daily newspapers than broadcast stations,
yet newspapers historically have been free from government regula-
tion of content except in such well recognized areas as obscenity and
libel. If relatively scarce newspapers have been exempted from con-
tent regulation by the first amendment, how can the government regu-
late relatively abundant television stations?
The answer is that scarcity is not measured by comparing the
number of units in different media, but by comparing the supply to
the demand in each medium. Although few people have the requisite
capital and skill to start a mass-circulation newspaper, anyone who
wishes can, in theory, start publishing. . . . The Government's only
function is to prevent physical interference, in the sense of preventing
rival publishers from smearing ink over a new publisher's papers.
With radio or television, the Government also functions to prevent
interference by requiring broadcasters to stay on assigned frequen-
cies. In broadcasting, however, the Government has the additional
function of parceling out the physical space-a portion of the electro-
magnetic spectrum-because there is not enough spectrum space to
accommodate everyone who wishes to broadcast.
Marks, Broadcasting and Censorship: First Amendment Theory After Red Lion, 38
GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 974, 979 n.37 (1970).
13395 U.S. 367 (1969).
'3'Barron, Access-The Only Choice for the Media?, 48 TEXAS L. Rv. 766, 770
(1970).
' 33 d. at 772. The ownership of the nation's newspapers is still very diversified,
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applicable to newspapers would be constitutional. 6 However, Bar-
ron's views of an expanded limited-access rationale appear questiona-
ble. In addition to concluding the Red Lion opinion with a statement
of the continuing vitality of the traditional limited-access rationale
for regulation of the broadcast media, '3 the Court has recently reaf-
firmed that the fairness doctrine is applicable only to those media
which use the airwaves.
138
In the case of Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee, 39 the Supreme Court held that the first amend-
ment does not compel broadcasters to accept editorial advertise-
ments and, in reaching its decision, indicated that a fairness doctrine
for the press would not be justified by analogy to the broadcast
media.4 0 Indeed, the print media were contrasted to the broadcast
media by their immunity to such regulation."'' The Court, while dem-
onstrating an unequivocal acceptance of the limited-access rationale
of broadcast regulation,' exhibited a keen awareness that the risks
however, and the number of daily newspapers has been stable for approximately thirty
years. See note 98 supra.
: 'Id. at 774. A bill introduced in the 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), and never re-
ported out of committee, H.R. 18927, would have imposed a fairness requirement on
large metropolitan newspapers and provided for F.C.C. enforcement. Other Congres-
sional efforts, which have shared the fate of H.R. 18927, include H.R. 18928, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), which would have revoked the antitrust exemption of newspa-
pers conducting business under joint operating agreements for failure to present diver-
gent viewpoints, and the ambitiously titled Truth Preservation Act, H.R. 1413, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), which would have required publication of editorial advertise-
ments under certain circumstances.
'p395 U.S. at 396-401. The Court also specifically refused to rest its decision in
Red Lion upon any access-oriented rationale of positive action to achieve first amend-
ment goals, as opposed to the traditional limited-access theory. Id. at 401 n.28.
"'Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412
U.S. 94 (1973).
'29d.
11id. at 117. The Court also noted that a general right to publish editorial adver-
tisements would not serve the public interest, as it would so heavily favor the affluent.
Id. at 123. The most affluent advertiser of all is, of course, the government. See note
115 supra.
"'412 U.S. at 117. The passage is quoted in relevant part at note 64 supra.
1 [T]he broadcast media pose unique and special problems not pres-
ent in the traditional free speech case. Unlike other media, broadcast-
ing is subject to an inherent physical limitation. Broadcast frequen-
cies are a scarce resource; they must be portioned out among appli-
cants. All who possess the financial resources and the desire to com-
municate by television or radio cannot be satisfactorily accommo-
dated. . ..
Because the broadcast media utilize a valuable and limited public
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of a "governmentally supervised right-of-access system" are far
greater than the potential benefits of such a system.' Therefore, in
light of CBS it seems clear that the Court is not disposed at the
present time to extend the fairness doctrine to the print media by way
of analogy and, thus, would not be likely to uphold the validity of
right or reply or access statutes."
In addition to the fairness doctrine analogy, a second argument
in support of right of reply or access legislation is based upon the
"public function" approach to the status of the print media. The
public function rationale rests on the view that private conduct may
become so intermeshed with governmental policies or so permeated
with a governmental character as "to become subject to the constitu-
tional limitations placed upon state action."'' Perhaps some of the
most vivid examples of application of the public function approach
are to be found in those cases where the Court has determined that
such private facilities as the roadways and sidewalks of a shopping
resource, there is also present an unusual order of first amendment
values.
Id. at 101.
By minimizing the difficult problems involved in implementing
such a right of access, the Court of Appeals failed to come to grips with
another problem of critical importance to broadcast regulation and
the First Amendment-the risk of an enlargement of Government
control over the content of broadcast discussion of public issues ....
Under a . . . Government supervised right-of-access system .. .
the Commission would be required to oversee far more of the day-to-
day operations. . .. deciding such questions as whether a particular
individual or group has had sufficient opportunity to present its view-
point and whether a viewpoint has already been sufficiently aired.
Regimenting broadcasters is too radical a therapy for the ailment
Respondents complain of.
Id. at 126-27. "To sacrifice First Amendment protections for so speculative a gain is
not warranted .... " Id. at 127. Thus, even in a medium where it is permitted to
balance the public interest against the first amendment protection, the negative impli-
cations of a right of access were found to outweigh whatever benefit such a right might
confer.
"'Id. at 114-21 (Burger, C.J.), 132-40 (Stewart, J., concurring).
"'Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Em-
ployees, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (shopping center
sidewalks and roadways had to be made available as in the case of other essentially
public sidewalks and roadways); Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451
(1952) (government regulation of streetcars and buses requires government to consider
first amendment rights of passengers); but see Lloyd Corporation, Ltd. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972) (where owner of shopping center posted notice that permission to use
the area could be revoked at any time there was no dediction to public use).
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center' or the streets in a company town'47 are so impressed with the
character of a public facility as to become public forums open to the
exercise of free speech. Essential to the utilization of the public func-
tion rationale is a finding that the particular facility involved has,
either in fact or in effect, been dedicated to a public use.4 8 At this
juncture, however, application of the public function doctrine to
newspapers or to the print media fails, for historically newspapers
have remained purely private enterprises characterized by their sepa-
ration from government, rather than by their disposition to make
their columns serve as a public forum.' Not only have newspapers
never granted the general public unrestricted access to their pages,
but they also have never undertaken to perform any function quasi-
governmental in nature, such as that of a public utility, which might
carry with it an obligation to fairly serve the public.' 0 Therefore,
"'Amalgamated Food Employees, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,. 391 U.S.
308 (1968).
"'Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
"'See, e.g., cases cited notes 145-47 supra; Kissinger v. New York Transit Author-
ity, 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (right to advertise politically via posters in
subway terminal); Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 268 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (distribution of leaflets in terminal); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit
Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967) (right to advertise in forum
deemed suitable for the expression of ideas by governmental agency).
I"Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435
F.2d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); Associates & Aldrich
Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971) (large daily newspapers); Avins
v. Rutgers, State Univ. of New Jersey, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 920 (1968) (state university law review); Resident-Participation of Denver, Inc.
v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971) (large daily newspaper). State courts are in
overwhelming agreement that newspapers are private enterprises, not touched with
any public use. E.g., Bloss v. Federated Publications, Inc., 380 Mich. 485, 157 N.W.2d
241 (1968); Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, 247 N.W. 813 (Iowa 1933); Friedenberg v.
Times Pub. Co., 170 La. 3, 127 So. 345 (1930); Commonwealth v. Boston Transcript
Co., 249 Mass. 477, 144 N.E. 400 (1924); Chronicle & Gazette Pub. Co. v. Atty. Gen.,
94 N.H. 148, 48 A.2d 478 (1946), appeal dismissed, 329 U.S. 690 (1947). State laws
regarding the purely business aspects of newspapers do not constitute the pervasive
participation necessary for a finding of state action, see, e.g., Associates & Aldrich Co.,
supra; Resident Participation, supra; although more extensive state regulation has
been relevant with respect to transportation facilities. Public Utilities Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 268 F. Supp. 855
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d
982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967).
'"Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435
F.2d 470, 475-76 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); Associates & Aldrich Co. v.
Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971); Resident Participation of Denver, Inc.
v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971).
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since newspapers do not share characteristics of those private facili-
ties to which the public function theory has been applied, it seems
doubtful that this approach could serve as a valid foundation for right
of reply or access statutes.'5 '
CONCLUSION
An examination of right of reply or access statutes has revealed
that, while such statutes are consistent with the goals of the first
amendment, they are not consistent with the means which the
amendment expressly prescribes for the achievement of those goals.
Thus, while it belongs to the intention of freedom of the press that
ideas shall be fully discussed and debated, even though not shared
by those who own or manage the press, this does not mean that
statutes are constitutional which grant access, as of right, to the
columns of the print media. Indeed, analysis of such statutes through
a defining of first amendment concepts reveals that to compel publi-
cation of items is, like compelling their exclusion from print, an un-
constitutonal abridgement of the freedom of the press. Furthermore,
a balancing of the public interest in the free flow of news and debate,
of the threat posed to that interest by current ownership trends in the
print media, and of the implications of right or reply or access stat-
utes for the continued independence and freedom of the press indi-
cates that such statutes might undermine the independence and free-
dom of the press without achieving substantial gains in the diversity
of the medium.
RAY V. HARTWELL, III
'51For a more detailed discussion of why newspapers do not serve a public function
of the type contemplated by cases such as Marsh and Logan Valley, notes 146-47 supra,
see cases cited note 150 supra; Note, Free Speech and the Mass Media, 57 VA. L. Rxv.
636, 638-42 (1971). Barron has conceded that application of the public function theory
to the print media through a finding that newspapers are dedicated to public use
requires "a rather rabid conception" of state action. Barron, supra note 6, at 1669.
The Supreme Court's holding in CBS that actions taken by the historically heavily
regulated broadcast media do not constitute governmental action would seem to indi-
cate that, a fortiori, the unregulated print media may not be compelled to grant access
to their columns on the theory that those media serve a "public function." Even if the
Court in CBS had adopted the reasoning of the dissent by Justices Brennan and
Marshall and found the broadcast media to be permeated with governmental action,
a like finding with respect to the print media would still be precluded. The indicia of
"state action" ascribed to the broadcast media include: the public nature of the air-
ways; the governmentally conferred status of licensees; and the pervasive scheme of
federal regulation of the media. As the dissent recognizes, these indicia are manifestly
inapplicable to the print media. 412 U.S. at 182 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined
by Marshall, J.).
